2023考研英語(yǔ)閱讀美國(guó)與復(fù)蘇政治學(xué)
America and the politics ofrecovery
美國(guó)與復(fù)蘇政治學(xué)
The big promise;What did Barack Obama s stimuluspackage really achieve?
高飛的承諾;巴拉克奧巴馬的刺激計(jì)劃究竟有何成就?
The New New Deal: The Hidden Story of Change inthe Obama Era. By Michael Grunwald.
《新新政：奧巴馬時(shí)代隱藏的變革史》，邁克爾格倫沃爾德著。
The word boondoggle, Michael Grunwald points out, was coined back in the days of theoriginal New Deal, to describe make-work bits of arts and craft paid for by thegovernment at a price that was out of all proportion to their actual value.
邁克爾格倫沃爾德指出：政府常常以與實(shí)際價(jià)值完全不成比例的價(jià)格來(lái)為一些無(wú)用的奢侈品買單，其中就包括為擴(kuò)大就業(yè)而安排的工作崗位早在羅斯福新政時(shí)代，人們就創(chuàng)造了無(wú)效投資一詞來(lái)描述這一概念。
This is not necessarily a bad thing. In times of economic woe, when normal patterns ofconsumption and investment are frozen, prodigal government spending can sometimes bethe only way to break the vicious circle of declining demand and shrinking employment.Value for money, paradoxically, can sometimes be an unaffordable luxury. To sum up JohnMaynard Keynes, it can even make sense to bury money in bottles, so that miners, and thesuppliers of their pickaxes and overalls, and those who sell food and materials to thosesuppliers can, in turn, benefit from the circulation of money that they dig up. MrGrunwald s newbook is the story of what was arguably the greatest boondoggle in history andthe politics that surrounded it, both before and since.
這并不一定是什么壞事。在經(jīng)濟(jì)困難時(shí)期，常規(guī)的消費(fèi)和投資模式會(huì)陷入僵局，慷慨的政府開(kāi)支有時(shí)候可能是打破需求下滑、失業(yè)率上升這個(gè)惡性循環(huán)的唯一途徑。很矛盾的是，現(xiàn)金價(jià)值有時(shí)候奢侈得難以承受。將凱恩斯的觀點(diǎn)簡(jiǎn)單概括一下：甚至連把錢放在瓶子里埋起來(lái)都是有意義的這樣礦工就能把這筆錢挖出來(lái)，從而用于流通;于是礦工本人、礦工的鶴嘴鎬和工裝褲的供應(yīng)商、以及向這些供應(yīng)商銷售食物和材料的人都可以依次從這種流通中獲益。格倫沃爾德這本新書(shū)介紹的可能是史上最大的一筆無(wú)效投資，以及這筆投資前后的政治背景。
Barack Obama s $787 billion stimulus package, enacted within a month of his taking office inJanuary 2009, amounted to about 4% of America s GDP. In the Depression of the 1930s, thebiggest stimulus in any year of Franklin Roosevelt s New Deal amounted to only about 1.5%of GDP. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, as Mr Obama s bill was formallynamed, was a tale that grew in the telling. In the months running up to the election inNovember 2008, the economy entered virtual free-fall. The severity of the downturnsurprised the participants, but long before he was elected, Mr Obama knew that he faced acrisis of 1930s proportions.
巴拉克奧巴馬于2009年1月上任后的一個(gè)月內(nèi)通過(guò)了 7870億美元的刺激計(jì)劃，這筆資金約占美國(guó) GDP 的4%。而20世紀(jì)30年代的大蕭條時(shí)期，在富蘭克林羅斯福的新政年間，最大的一筆刺激方案也只占當(dāng)時(shí)GDP 的約1.5%。奧巴馬法案的正式名稱為《美國(guó)復(fù)蘇與再投資法案》，它的規(guī)模越來(lái)越大了。在2008年11月大選前的幾個(gè)月，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)幾乎直線下滑。衰退的嚴(yán)重性讓各位候選人感到吃驚。但奧巴馬在當(dāng)選以前很早就意識(shí)到了他將面臨像20世紀(jì)30年代那樣嚴(yán)重的危機(jī)。
Mr Grunwald s book does a meticulous job, casting much new light on the advance thinkingof Mr Obama s team, both before the election and, especially, during the long transition. Inthe last quarter of 2008, the final three months of the Bush era, the American economycontracted by an astonishing 8.9%. By early 2009 job losses hit 800,000 a month. The sizeof the policy response grew too. An early plan, calculated at $300 billion, grew, long beforeinauguration day, to around $800 billion. And that, as Mr Grunwald makes clear, was verymuch at the low end of what Mr Obama s economists thought was required.
格倫沃爾德的這本書(shū)做了細(xì)致入微的研究，讓人們對(duì)當(dāng)年選舉前、特別是在漫長(zhǎng)的過(guò)渡時(shí)期中的奧巴馬團(tuán)隊(duì)先進(jìn)思想有了更多的了解。在2008年最后一個(gè)季度，布什時(shí)代最后的三個(gè)月里，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)萎縮了8.9%，令人驚訝。截至2009年早期，失業(yè)人數(shù)達(dá)到每月80萬(wàn)人。政府也加大了應(yīng)對(duì)政策的力度。早在奧巴馬就職日之前，預(yù)估價(jià)值為3000億美元的早期計(jì)劃就提高到了約 8000億美元。格倫沃爾德表明，甚至連這個(gè)數(shù)目都大大低于奧巴馬經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的預(yù)期。
One thing that may surprise readers not fully acquainted with the grisly nature of politicalsausage-making is the degree of cynicism that surrounded the passing of the Recovery Act.It was naive of Mr Obama to expect the Republicans to play ball. But because he needed towin at least a couple of their votes in the Senate to break the threat of a filibuster, he triedhard to court them. Mr Grunwald lays out in shocking detail how the Republican leadershipdecided early and wholeheartedly not to co-operate with the new president. So deep wastheir opposition that they even opposed things that they supposedly supported, such as theRecovery Act s deep tax cuts and its emphasis on infrastructure.
有些讀者對(duì)于政治裹香腸那可憎的特性并不完全了解。他們可能會(huì)感到驚奇針對(duì)《復(fù)蘇法案》的通過(guò)，政界存在嚴(yán)重的犬儒主義。如果奧巴馬期待能與共和黨合作，他就太天真了。但他需要在參議院贏得至少部分共和黨的選票，以避免自己的議案遭到阻撓。因此，他極力取悅共和黨人。格倫沃爾德清楚地提及了共和黨領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層是如何早早決定完全不與新總統(tǒng)合作的，細(xì)節(jié)所到令人震驚。共和黨的反對(duì)情緒極為強(qiáng)烈，以至于本應(yīng)支持的觀點(diǎn)，他們都加以反對(duì)如《復(fù)蘇法案》所主張的深度減稅、強(qiáng)調(diào)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施等等。
As cynical as this may have been, it made political sense. If the stimulus succeeded, MrObama would get all the credit. If it failed, the Republicans could portray themselves ashaving been on the side of fiscal prudence. Since then, the economy has stubbornlyrefused to grow at anything beyond an an . Many Republican economists, such as therespected Mark Zandi, who advised John McCain in his contest with Mr Obama, agree thatwithout it, things would have been even worse. But the problem is that it did not work wellenough. As a result, the Republicans triumphed at the mid-term vote and Mr Obama s ratingsare now uncomfortably low as he struggles for re-election.
盡管共和黨的這種態(tài)度可能有些憤世嫉俗了，但它在政治上是說(shuō)得通的。如果刺激成功了，奧巴馬將得到各方的贊揚(yáng);如果刺激失敗了，共和黨人會(huì)表示他們可是一直都支持穩(wěn)健的財(cái)政方針的。自從那時(shí)起，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)一直衰弱無(wú)力，頑固地拒絕增長(zhǎng)。許多共和黨經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家同意，如果沒(méi)有奧巴馬的刺激計(jì)劃，情況將變得更糟。但問(wèn)題在于該計(jì)劃的成效并不是十分顯著。于是，共和黨在中期選舉投票中獲勝了;而奧巴馬力爭(zhēng)連任，得票率卻低的可憐。
Mr Grunwald s heart plainly beats on the left, and it is clear that he admires Mr Obama, withhis hyper-rational side. At the same time, the author does make some effort to explain theRepublican point of view. The whole point of an economic stimulus is that it is supposed tostimulate. It needs to move money out of the door fast, get it quickly to where it can domost good and not carry with it a tail of long-term spending commitments. But Mr Obama sagenda was always much bigger than that, and it is in explaining this that Mr Grunwald sbook is at its best.
可以看出，格倫沃爾德傾向于左派;他有過(guò)于理性的一面，顯然比較贊賞奧巴馬。然而，他的確也做了一些努力來(lái)闡述共和黨的觀點(diǎn)。經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激的全部意義就在于它應(yīng)當(dāng)去進(jìn)行刺激。它需要讓資金涌出閘門，迅速把這筆錢送到能帶來(lái)最多效益的地方，而不是拖著長(zhǎng)期開(kāi)支投入的尾巴。但奧巴馬的胃口總是遠(yuǎn)不止如此，而格倫沃爾德這本書(shū)最擅長(zhǎng)的就是解釋這一點(diǎn)。
Much of the meat involves parsing the issues that riled the Republicans: how the stimulus billwas to be used as a tool to transform American society. Right from the start, Mr Obamawanted his Recovery Act to spend money on a low-carbon future, on radical school reform,on health reform and on creating jobs. All of these, Mr Grunwald thinks, are laudable aims.Many readers would agree. But Republicans in Washington have other views. New energyprojects, like job creation, should be left to the market, not picked by bureaucrats; school andhealth reform should be a matter for individual states. What they saw was an attempt to usethe crisis to push the political economy of America in a more statist and Washington-centricdirection. Mr Grunwald does not attempt to deny that; it is simply that he has no problemwith it.
本書(shū)的主要部分大多都在剖析共和黨感到惱怒的幾個(gè)問(wèn)題：如何將刺激法案用作轉(zhuǎn)化美國(guó)社會(huì)的工具。從一開(kāi)始，奧巴馬就要求《復(fù)蘇法案》在以下幾個(gè)方面進(jìn)行投資：向低碳社會(huì)的轉(zhuǎn)變、徹底的學(xué)校改革、衛(wèi)生改革以及創(chuàng)造就業(yè)崗位。格倫沃爾德認(rèn)為所有這些目標(biāo)都是值得贊賞的。許多讀者也會(huì)認(rèn)同這一點(diǎn)。但華盛頓的共和黨并不這么想。他們認(rèn)為新能源項(xiàng)目和創(chuàng)造就業(yè)崗位應(yīng)當(dāng)交給市場(chǎng)去引導(dǎo)，而不是由當(dāng)局來(lái)推動(dòng);學(xué)校改革和衛(wèi)生改革應(yīng)當(dāng)根據(jù)各個(gè)州的具體情況進(jìn)行。他們認(rèn)為奧巴馬在試圖利用危機(jī)把美國(guó)的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)推向一個(gè)以華盛頓為中心、中央集權(quán)度更高的方向。格倫沃爾德并未試圖否認(rèn)這一點(diǎn);他對(duì)此完全沒(méi)有異議。
The most interesting part of the book is the part that leaves most questions open. What willbe the legacy of all Mr Obama s greening and rebuilding? Mr Grunwald waxes on about thecleverness of Steven Chu, the president s energy secretary,and all the amazing things thathis scientists think they can do with their oodles of new cash. But there have also, as headmits, been many failures. Mr Grunwald s instinct is to praise the splashing around ofgovernment money for untested new technologies which, when exposed to life without thegovernment teat, may quickly wither. Governments make bad venture capitalists, as thebook quotes Larry Summers, a key member of the president s original team, as saying.
本書(shū)最有趣的部分在于它將大多數(shù)問(wèn)題留給了讀者思考。奧巴馬的眾多環(huán)保和重建措施將給美國(guó)留下什么樣的遺產(chǎn)?格倫沃爾德描述了奧巴馬的能源部長(zhǎng)朱棣文的機(jī)智，也描述了這位總統(tǒng)手下的科學(xué)家他們認(rèn)為利用大筆新有資金可以做一些驚人的事情。但格倫沃爾德承認(rèn)，奧巴馬政府也存在不少失敗之處。有些政府資金經(jīng)過(guò)種種周轉(zhuǎn)，用于未經(jīng)檢驗(yàn)的新技術(shù)，格倫沃爾德本能地對(duì)此加以贊揚(yáng)。但當(dāng)這些新技術(shù)離開(kāi)政府的懷抱以后，可能很快就夭折了。本書(shū)引述了奧巴馬早期團(tuán)隊(duì)重要成員勞倫斯薩默斯的言論：政府并不是好的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家。
The truth is that no one really knows yet how well spent the longer-term parts of theimmense Recovery and Reinvestment Act will turn out to have been. But no writer has yetgone this far, at least in unravelling where the money has gone. The New New Deal is themost interesting book that has been published about the Obama administration. EvenRepublicans should read it.
事實(shí)上，《復(fù)蘇與再投資法案》篇幅很長(zhǎng)，其中的長(zhǎng)期部分最終能否妥善付諸實(shí)施，還沒(méi)有人真正清楚。但還沒(méi)有任何作家進(jìn)行過(guò)如此深入的探究，至少還沒(méi)有人闡明這筆資金的去向。在關(guān)于奧巴馬政府的出版物中，《新新政》是最有趣的一本書(shū)。即使是共和黨人都應(yīng)該拿來(lái)讀一讀。
America and the politics ofrecovery
美國(guó)與復(fù)蘇政治學(xué)
The big promise;What did Barack Obama s stimuluspackage really achieve?
高飛的承諾;巴拉克奧巴馬的刺激計(jì)劃究竟有何成就?
The New New Deal: The Hidden Story of Change inthe Obama Era. By Michael Grunwald.
《新新政：奧巴馬時(shí)代隱藏的變革史》，邁克爾格倫沃爾德著。
The word boondoggle, Michael Grunwald points out, was coined back in the days of theoriginal New Deal, to describe make-work bits of arts and craft paid for by thegovernment at a price that was out of all proportion to their actual value.
邁克爾格倫沃爾德指出：政府常常以與實(shí)際價(jià)值完全不成比例的價(jià)格來(lái)為一些無(wú)用的奢侈品買單，其中就包括為擴(kuò)大就業(yè)而安排的工作崗位早在羅斯福新政時(shí)代，人們就創(chuàng)造了無(wú)效投資一詞來(lái)描述這一概念。
This is not necessarily a bad thing. In times of economic woe, when normal patterns ofconsumption and investment are frozen, prodigal government spending can sometimes bethe only way to break the vicious circle of declining demand and shrinking employment.Value for money, paradoxically, can sometimes be an unaffordable luxury. To sum up JohnMaynard Keynes, it can even make sense to bury money in bottles, so that miners, and thesuppliers of their pickaxes and overalls, and those who sell food and materials to thosesuppliers can, in turn, benefit from the circulation of money that they dig up. MrGrunwald s newbook is the story of what was arguably the greatest boondoggle in history andthe politics that surrounded it, both before and since.
這并不一定是什么壞事。在經(jīng)濟(jì)困難時(shí)期，常規(guī)的消費(fèi)和投資模式會(huì)陷入僵局，慷慨的政府開(kāi)支有時(shí)候可能是打破需求下滑、失業(yè)率上升這個(gè)惡性循環(huán)的唯一途徑。很矛盾的是，現(xiàn)金價(jià)值有時(shí)候奢侈得難以承受。將凱恩斯的觀點(diǎn)簡(jiǎn)單概括一下：甚至連把錢放在瓶子里埋起來(lái)都是有意義的這樣礦工就能把這筆錢挖出來(lái)，從而用于流通;于是礦工本人、礦工的鶴嘴鎬和工裝褲的供應(yīng)商、以及向這些供應(yīng)商銷售食物和材料的人都可以依次從這種流通中獲益。格倫沃爾德這本新書(shū)介紹的可能是史上最大的一筆無(wú)效投資，以及這筆投資前后的政治背景。
Barack Obama s $787 billion stimulus package, enacted within a month of his taking office inJanuary 2009, amounted to about 4% of America s GDP. In the Depression of the 1930s, thebiggest stimulus in any year of Franklin Roosevelt s New Deal amounted to only about 1.5%of GDP. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, as Mr Obama s bill was formallynamed, was a tale that grew in the telling. In the months running up to the election inNovember 2008, the economy entered virtual free-fall. The severity of the downturnsurprised the participants, but long before he was elected, Mr Obama knew that he faced acrisis of 1930s proportions.
巴拉克奧巴馬于2009年1月上任后的一個(gè)月內(nèi)通過(guò)了 7870億美元的刺激計(jì)劃，這筆資金約占美國(guó) GDP 的4%。而20世紀(jì)30年代的大蕭條時(shí)期，在富蘭克林羅斯福的新政年間，最大的一筆刺激方案也只占當(dāng)時(shí)GDP 的約1.5%。奧巴馬法案的正式名稱為《美國(guó)復(fù)蘇與再投資法案》，它的規(guī)模越來(lái)越大了。在2008年11月大選前的幾個(gè)月，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)幾乎直線下滑。衰退的嚴(yán)重性讓各位候選人感到吃驚。但奧巴馬在當(dāng)選以前很早就意識(shí)到了他將面臨像20世紀(jì)30年代那樣嚴(yán)重的危機(jī)。
Mr Grunwald s book does a meticulous job, casting much new light on the advance thinkingof Mr Obama s team, both before the election and, especially, during the long transition. Inthe last quarter of 2008, the final three months of the Bush era, the American economycontracted by an astonishing 8.9%. By early 2009 job losses hit 800,000 a month. The sizeof the policy response grew too. An early plan, calculated at $300 billion, grew, long beforeinauguration day, to around $800 billion. And that, as Mr Grunwald makes clear, was verymuch at the low end of what Mr Obama s economists thought was required.
格倫沃爾德的這本書(shū)做了細(xì)致入微的研究，讓人們對(duì)當(dāng)年選舉前、特別是在漫長(zhǎng)的過(guò)渡時(shí)期中的奧巴馬團(tuán)隊(duì)先進(jìn)思想有了更多的了解。在2008年最后一個(gè)季度，布什時(shí)代最后的三個(gè)月里，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)萎縮了8.9%，令人驚訝。截至2009年早期，失業(yè)人數(shù)達(dá)到每月80萬(wàn)人。政府也加大了應(yīng)對(duì)政策的力度。早在奧巴馬就職日之前，預(yù)估價(jià)值為3000億美元的早期計(jì)劃就提高到了約 8000億美元。格倫沃爾德表明，甚至連這個(gè)數(shù)目都大大低于奧巴馬經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的預(yù)期。
One thing that may surprise readers not fully acquainted with the grisly nature of politicalsausage-making is the degree of cynicism that surrounded the passing of the Recovery Act.It was naive of Mr Obama to expect the Republicans to play ball. But because he needed towin at least a couple of their votes in the Senate to break the threat of a filibuster, he triedhard to court them. Mr Grunwald lays out in shocking detail how the Republican leadershipdecided early and wholeheartedly not to co-operate with the new president. So deep wastheir opposition that they even opposed things that they supposedly supported, such as theRecovery Act s deep tax cuts and its emphasis on infrastructure.
有些讀者對(duì)于政治裹香腸那可憎的特性并不完全了解。他們可能會(huì)感到驚奇針對(duì)《復(fù)蘇法案》的通過(guò)，政界存在嚴(yán)重的犬儒主義。如果奧巴馬期待能與共和黨合作，他就太天真了。但他需要在參議院贏得至少部分共和黨的選票，以避免自己的議案遭到阻撓。因此，他極力取悅共和黨人。格倫沃爾德清楚地提及了共和黨領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層是如何早早決定完全不與新總統(tǒng)合作的，細(xì)節(jié)所到令人震驚。共和黨的反對(duì)情緒極為強(qiáng)烈，以至于本應(yīng)支持的觀點(diǎn)，他們都加以反對(duì)如《復(fù)蘇法案》所主張的深度減稅、強(qiáng)調(diào)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施等等。
As cynical as this may have been, it made political sense. If the stimulus succeeded, MrObama would get all the credit. If it failed, the Republicans could portray themselves ashaving been on the side of fiscal prudence. Since then, the economy has stubbornlyrefused to grow at anything beyond an an . Many Republican economists, such as therespected Mark Zandi, who advised John McCain in his contest with Mr Obama, agree thatwithout it, things would have been even worse. But the problem is that it did not work wellenough. As a result, the Republicans triumphed at the mid-term vote and Mr Obama s ratingsare now uncomfortably low as he struggles for re-election.
盡管共和黨的這種態(tài)度可能有些憤世嫉俗了，但它在政治上是說(shuō)得通的。如果刺激成功了，奧巴馬將得到各方的贊揚(yáng);如果刺激失敗了，共和黨人會(huì)表示他們可是一直都支持穩(wěn)健的財(cái)政方針的。自從那時(shí)起，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)一直衰弱無(wú)力，頑固地拒絕增長(zhǎng)。許多共和黨經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家同意，如果沒(méi)有奧巴馬的刺激計(jì)劃，情況將變得更糟。但問(wèn)題在于該計(jì)劃的成效并不是十分顯著。于是，共和黨在中期選舉投票中獲勝了;而奧巴馬力爭(zhēng)連任，得票率卻低的可憐。
Mr Grunwald s heart plainly beats on the left, and it is clear that he admires Mr Obama, withhis hyper-rational side. At the same time, the author does make some effort to explain theRepublican point of view. The whole point of an economic stimulus is that it is supposed tostimulate. It needs to move money out of the door fast, get it quickly to where it can domost good and not carry with it a tail of long-term spending commitments. But Mr Obama sagenda was always much bigger than that, and it is in explaining this that Mr Grunwald sbook is at its best.
可以看出，格倫沃爾德傾向于左派;他有過(guò)于理性的一面，顯然比較贊賞奧巴馬。然而，他的確也做了一些努力來(lái)闡述共和黨的觀點(diǎn)。經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激的全部意義就在于它應(yīng)當(dāng)去進(jìn)行刺激。它需要讓資金涌出閘門，迅速把這筆錢送到能帶來(lái)最多效益的地方，而不是拖著長(zhǎng)期開(kāi)支投入的尾巴。但奧巴馬的胃口總是遠(yuǎn)不止如此，而格倫沃爾德這本書(shū)最擅長(zhǎng)的就是解釋這一點(diǎn)。
Much of the meat involves parsing the issues that riled the Republicans: how the stimulus billwas to be used as a tool to transform American society. Right from the start, Mr Obamawanted his Recovery Act to spend money on a low-carbon future, on radical school reform,on health reform and on creating jobs. All of these, Mr Grunwald thinks, are laudable aims.Many readers would agree. But Republicans in Washington have other views. New energyprojects, like job creation, should be left to the market, not picked by bureaucrats; school andhealth reform should be a matter for individual states. What they saw was an attempt to usethe crisis to push the political economy of America in a more statist and Washington-centricdirection. Mr Grunwald does not attempt to deny that; it is simply that he has no problemwith it.
本書(shū)的主要部分大多都在剖析共和黨感到惱怒的幾個(gè)問(wèn)題：如何將刺激法案用作轉(zhuǎn)化美國(guó)社會(huì)的工具。從一開(kāi)始，奧巴馬就要求《復(fù)蘇法案》在以下幾個(gè)方面進(jìn)行投資：向低碳社會(huì)的轉(zhuǎn)變、徹底的學(xué)校改革、衛(wèi)生改革以及創(chuàng)造就業(yè)崗位。格倫沃爾德認(rèn)為所有這些目標(biāo)都是值得贊賞的。許多讀者也會(huì)認(rèn)同這一點(diǎn)。但華盛頓的共和黨并不這么想。他們認(rèn)為新能源項(xiàng)目和創(chuàng)造就業(yè)崗位應(yīng)當(dāng)交給市場(chǎng)去引導(dǎo)，而不是由當(dāng)局來(lái)推動(dòng);學(xué)校改革和衛(wèi)生改革應(yīng)當(dāng)根據(jù)各個(gè)州的具體情況進(jìn)行。他們認(rèn)為奧巴馬在試圖利用危機(jī)把美國(guó)的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)推向一個(gè)以華盛頓為中心、中央集權(quán)度更高的方向。格倫沃爾德并未試圖否認(rèn)這一點(diǎn);他對(duì)此完全沒(méi)有異議。
The most interesting part of the book is the part that leaves most questions open. What willbe the legacy of all Mr Obama s greening and rebuilding? Mr Grunwald waxes on about thecleverness of Steven Chu, the president s energy secretary,and all the amazing things thathis scientists think they can do with their oodles of new cash. But there have also, as headmits, been many failures. Mr Grunwald s instinct is to praise the splashing around ofgovernment money for untested new technologies which, when exposed to life without thegovernment teat, may quickly wither. Governments make bad venture capitalists, as thebook quotes Larry Summers, a key member of the president s original team, as saying.
本書(shū)最有趣的部分在于它將大多數(shù)問(wèn)題留給了讀者思考。奧巴馬的眾多環(huán)保和重建措施將給美國(guó)留下什么樣的遺產(chǎn)?格倫沃爾德描述了奧巴馬的能源部長(zhǎng)朱棣文的機(jī)智，也描述了這位總統(tǒng)手下的科學(xué)家他們認(rèn)為利用大筆新有資金可以做一些驚人的事情。但格倫沃爾德承認(rèn)，奧巴馬政府也存在不少失敗之處。有些政府資金經(jīng)過(guò)種種周轉(zhuǎn)，用于未經(jīng)檢驗(yàn)的新技術(shù)，格倫沃爾德本能地對(duì)此加以贊揚(yáng)。但當(dāng)這些新技術(shù)離開(kāi)政府的懷抱以后，可能很快就夭折了。本書(shū)引述了奧巴馬早期團(tuán)隊(duì)重要成員勞倫斯薩默斯的言論：政府并不是好的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家。
The truth is that no one really knows yet how well spent the longer-term parts of theimmense Recovery and Reinvestment Act will turn out to have been. But no writer has yetgone this far, at least in unravelling where the money has gone. The New New Deal is themost interesting book that has been published about the Obama administration. EvenRepublicans should read it.
事實(shí)上，《復(fù)蘇與再投資法案》篇幅很長(zhǎng)，其中的長(zhǎng)期部分最終能否妥善付諸實(shí)施，還沒(méi)有人真正清楚。但還沒(méi)有任何作家進(jìn)行過(guò)如此深入的探究，至少還沒(méi)有人闡明這筆資金的去向。在關(guān)于奧巴馬政府的出版物中，《新新政》是最有趣的一本書(shū)。即使是共和黨人都應(yīng)該拿來(lái)讀一讀。
