2023考研英語閱讀狡猾的迪克和美元

　　TrickyDick and the dollar

　　狡猾的迪克和美元

　　Does Richard Nixon have anything to teach BarackObama about economic diplomacy?

　　在經(jīng)濟外交上，尼克松真的有可以教奧巴馬的嗎?

　　THE Nixon shock is not the name given toPresident Richard Nixon s resignation in 1974amid the Watergate scandal, his bombing ofCambodia during the Vietnam war or hisaudacious visit to communist China. It refersinstead to a bundle of economic policies unveiled to an unsuspecting world on August 15th1971. The president imposed a freeze on wages and prices for 90 days to break inflation,ended the convertibility of dollars into gold, and slapped a surcharge or tariff of 10% onimports.

　　尼克松沖擊不是在說美國故總統(tǒng)尼克松在1974年為水門事件而下臺，也不是在說他在越戰(zhàn)期間對柬埔寨大肆轟炸，更不是在說他大膽的造訪了共產(chǎn)中國。這詞是在說他在1971年8月15日毫無預(yù)警的對世界宣布了一套經(jīng)濟政策。這位總統(tǒng)為了遏止通脹，將薪資成長和物價凍結(jié)了九十天，終結(jié)了美元和黃金可以用一定比例互換的制度，也對進口貨物扣上了10%的附加稅。

　　Nixon is not usually a source of inspiration for left-leaning pundits such as Paul Krugman ofthe New York Times. But like 130 congressmen, who this month signed a letter to TimothyGeithner, America s treasury secretary, he is calling on the White House to emulate Nixonand impose a surcharge on imports from China. The tariff is supposed to force China tostrengthen its currency, the yuan, against the dollar, just as Nixon s surcharge promptedAmerica s trading partners to renegotiate their exchange rates four months later.

　　左傾的評論家如紐約時報的保羅˙克魯曼，通常是不會把尼克松當(dāng)作是惕勵的對象。但是這個月，他連同一百三十位眾議員簽暑了一封信給美國的財政部長提摩西˙蓋特納，信中呼吁白宮要仿效尼克松對中國進口物品課征附加稅。這個進口稅的用意是要逼使中國讓人民幣對美元升值，正如當(dāng)年尼克松的附加稅逼使美國的貿(mào)易伙伴在四個月后重新議定匯率。

　　Mr Krugman argues that China s weak yuan is costing America roughly 1.4m jobs. Its cheapcurrency gives its exporters an edge in the American marketplace. China then squirrels itsdollar earnings away in American securities rather than spending them on American goods.In normal circumstances these asset purchases would lower interest rates, boosting Americanborrowing and spending. But America, like other rich countries, is now caught in a liquiditytrap. Interest rates are as low as they can go. By saving dollars rather than spending them,China is draining demand from the world economy.

　　克魯曼先生主張，中國被低估的人民幣，讓美國失去了將近一百四十萬個工作。低估的匯率給了中國出口商在美國市場上的優(yōu)勢。然后中國像松鼠般把錢投資到美國證券上存起來，而不是用來買美國的商品。在正常情況下，對美國資產(chǎn)的投資會降低利率，因而提升美國人的借貸和消費。但是美國現(xiàn)在，和其他富有國家一樣，也陷入了所謂的流動性陷阱。利率已經(jīng)降無可降。中國將美元存起而不消費的行為，正消耗著世界的需求。

　　China s foreign-exchange reserves now total $2.4 trillion, of which about 70% are thought tobe in dollars. In 1971 the central banks of America s trading partners had amassed a rathersmaller hoard, of about $40 billion. But that was enough to buy the gold in Fort Knox threetimes over, if America upheld its commitment to sell the metal at $35 an ounce. Britain srequest to exchange dollars for gold on August 13th 1971 was the last straw. Although theUS government attached no great importance to the gold as such, a run on this gold wouldhave been a sorry spectacle, wrote George Shultz and Kenneth Dam, two prominenteconomic officials in the Nixon administration, in their book Economic Policy Beyond theHeadlines. On August 15th Nixon, in effect, announced that America was now unwilling todo what it would soon be incapable of doingconverting dollars into gold at the agreedexchange rate.

　　中國的外匯存底現(xiàn)在總計達2.4萬億美元，其中大約70%是存成美元。在1971年時，美國貿(mào)易伙伴的央行累積的美元不多，大約只有四百億美元?？墒侨绻绹攀禺?dāng)時美元和黃金的兌換率，35美元兌一盎司黃金，這些美元已然足夠可以買下三倍諾克斯堡庫存的所有的黃金。英國在1971年8月13日要求將其持有美元兌換黃金是壓倒駱駝的最后一根稻草。兩位尼克松幕僚的重要經(jīng)濟官員，喬治˙舒爾茨和肯尼˙丹，在他們的書頭條背后的經(jīng)濟政策中說，雖然美國政府不認(rèn)為黃金非常重要，但是如果發(fā)生黃金擠兌卻也實在難看。在 8月15日，尼克松實際上宣布了美國政府不愿意履行其即將沒有能力履行的事--將美元按既定的匯率兌換黃金。

　　Messrs Shultz and Dam argue that the import surcharge was intended as anattention-getter and a bargaining chip. It allowed John Connally, Nixon s treasury secretaryand a Texan, to stride down the corridors of international finance with both guns blazing. Inthe face of this bravado America s trading partners duly backed down. By December theyagreed to let the dollar fall and the surcharge wasremoved. Nixon was able to present the humbling of the dollar as a political victory. But wereBarack Obama to emulate him, would he really enjoy the same result?

　　舒爾茨先生和丹先生認(rèn)為進口的附加稅是刻意用來做為注意喚醒劑和談判籌碼。好讓尼克松那位德州人的財政部長約翰˙ 康納利，走在國際金融的大街上，手持雙槍亮晃。在這樣的威嚇下，美國的貿(mào)易伙伴們?nèi)脊怨跃头?。十二月不到，他們就同意讓美元貶值，附加稅也跟著取消。尼克松當(dāng)時將美元的貶值宣傳成政治上的勝利。不過如果奧巴馬如法泡制，他會真的贏得同樣的結(jié)果嗎?

　　The obvious difference is that in 1971 America was locked into a system of fixed parities. Bypegging to the dollar, a currency was automatically fixed to everything else. Since July 2008China has pegged the yuan to the greenback. But over that period its currency has swung upand down against those of its trading partners and competitors. On a trade-weighted basisthe yuan is back to where it was when the financial crisis started. Indeed, compared withChina s emerging-market competitors in its big export markets, the yuan is about 12%more expensive today than it was before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, according to ameasure calculated by the Hong KongMonetary Authority. By this indicator China s currency is about 25% above its level in 2005.

　　今昔最明顯的差別是，在1971年時，美國和其他國家的貨幣是采用固定匯率制。任何一個貨幣，只要對美元掛鉤，就會自動的與其他貨幣掛鉤。自2008年 7月以來，中國維持人民幣與美元掛鉤。但是，在同一段時間里，人民幣與其貿(mào)易伙伴和競爭者的貨幣，在匯率上卻有著上下的擺蕩。以交易額加權(quán)平均數(shù)為基準(zhǔn)來看，人民幣的幣值和金融危機開始時相差不多。根據(jù)香港主管貨幣機構(gòu)編纂的一個指數(shù)，中國比起其出口上競爭的新興國家，確實在幣值上比雷曼兄弟倒閉時升值了 12%。這個指數(shù)也指出，中國的貨幣比2005年的水平要升值了25%。

　　The second difference is related to the first. Because everybody was pegged to the dollar in1971, everybody had to pay the surcharge. Nixon dismayed everyone but discriminatedagainst no one. China s critics today, on the other hand, urge Mr Obama to slap a tariff onChinese goods alone. This will reduce the demand for Chinese imports, which constituteabout 15% of America s total. But there is no guarantee that customers will switch fromChinese goods to American ones instead. They are more likely to buy from China s rivals inAsia. The surcharge may change the composition of America s trade deficit, withoutnecessarily changing its size.

　　第二個差別和第一個有關(guān)。在1971年時，所有的貨幣都和美元掛鉤，所以所有的國家都必須被課附加稅。尼克松讓所有的國家都沮喪，但卻沒對任何一個國家有差別待遇。今天批評中國的人，卻催促奧巴馬先生單獨對中國商品扣上附加稅。雖然這將減少對目前占美國總進口15%的中國進口品的需求。卻不保證消費者會轉(zhuǎn)而購買美國的產(chǎn)品。更可能的是，他們會對中國在亞洲的競爭者下單。附加稅只會改變美國貿(mào)易赤字的組成比例，而不見得能改變其規(guī)模。

　　Nixon goes to China

　　尼克松造訪中國

　　The Nixon shock holds lessons for China as well as Mr Obama. Like China today, Germany inthe 1960s disavowed any responsibility for the world s imbalances, insisting that the solutionlay with tighter policies in deficit countries rather than looser policies in surplus countries. But by holding fast to the dollar, Germanyended up importing America s laxity. It could not insulate itself from the loose monetarypolicy engineered to help Nixon win the 1972 election. German prices rose by over 5% in1971. China, too, risks a loss of macroeconomic control if it continues to peg to the dollar.Its money supply grew by about 35% in the year to February. That kind of surge may be aprecursor to inflation.

　　尼克松的沖擊，對中國以及奧巴馬來說，都有借鏡之處。正如今日的中國，1960年代的德國，也是拒絕承認(rèn)對世界的貿(mào)易失衡有任何關(guān)系，并堅持解決之道在于貿(mào)易逆差國要緊縮，而不是貿(mào)易順差國要放寬?？墒墙?jīng)由對美元的掛鉤，德國最終進口到美國貨幣上的寬松。尼克松為了贏得1972年選舉，泡制了寬松的貨幣政策，而德國無法置身其外。德國物價在1971年上升了超過5%。如果人民幣繼續(xù)和美元掛鉤，中國也同樣冒著宏觀經(jīng)濟失控的風(fēng)險。該國貨幣供給在到二月份截止的年度里成長了35%。這種飆升也許是通脹的前兆。

　　The advocates of a surcharge argue that China will not act unless it is forced to do so. Theypoint to defensive remarks by Wen Jiabao, China s prime minister, arguing that the yuanwas not undervalued and would remain basically stable. But the demise of the BrettonWoods system suggests that official statements can be a poor guide to future policy. Thedecision not to revalue is final, unequivocal and for eternity. That s not a Chinese officialin 2010, but a German official in the Nixon erajust five months before the Deutschmark wasrevalued by 9.3%.

　　附加稅的鼓吹者主張，中國必須要有人施壓才會行動。他們指出中國的總理溫家寶仍做著防衛(wèi)性的評論，說人民幣并沒被低估，也將會維持基本上穩(wěn)定。但是布雷頓森林體系的廢棄，說明著官方說詞通常不代表未來政策的走向。德國官方在尼克松時代說，我們決定不升值，而這決定是不會改變、毫不含糊、直到永久。這聽起來像是中國官方的說法。在五個月后，德國馬克升值了 9.3%。

　　TrickyDick and the dollar

　　狡猾的迪克和美元

　　Does Richard Nixon have anything to teach BarackObama about economic diplomacy?

　　在經(jīng)濟外交上，尼克松真的有可以教奧巴馬的嗎?

　　THE Nixon shock is not the name given toPresident Richard Nixon s resignation in 1974amid the Watergate scandal, his bombing ofCambodia during the Vietnam war or hisaudacious visit to communist China. It refersinstead to a bundle of economic policies unveiled to an unsuspecting world on August 15th1971. The president imposed a freeze on wages and prices for 90 days to break inflation,ended the convertibility of dollars into gold, and slapped a surcharge or tariff of 10% onimports.

　　尼克松沖擊不是在說美國故總統(tǒng)尼克松在1974年為水門事件而下臺，也不是在說他在越戰(zhàn)期間對柬埔寨大肆轟炸，更不是在說他大膽的造訪了共產(chǎn)中國。這詞是在說他在1971年8月15日毫無預(yù)警的對世界宣布了一套經(jīng)濟政策。這位總統(tǒng)為了遏止通脹，將薪資成長和物價凍結(jié)了九十天，終結(jié)了美元和黃金可以用一定比例互換的制度，也對進口貨物扣上了10%的附加稅。

　　Nixon is not usually a source of inspiration for left-leaning pundits such as Paul Krugman ofthe New York Times. But like 130 congressmen, who this month signed a letter to TimothyGeithner, America s treasury secretary, he is calling on the White House to emulate Nixonand impose a surcharge on imports from China. The tariff is supposed to force China tostrengthen its currency, the yuan, against the dollar, just as Nixon s surcharge promptedAmerica s trading partners to renegotiate their exchange rates four months later.

　　左傾的評論家如紐約時報的保羅˙克魯曼，通常是不會把尼克松當(dāng)作是惕勵的對象。但是這個月，他連同一百三十位眾議員簽暑了一封信給美國的財政部長提摩西˙蓋特納，信中呼吁白宮要仿效尼克松對中國進口物品課征附加稅。這個進口稅的用意是要逼使中國讓人民幣對美元升值，正如當(dāng)年尼克松的附加稅逼使美國的貿(mào)易伙伴在四個月后重新議定匯率。

　　Mr Krugman argues that China s weak yuan is costing America roughly 1.4m jobs. Its cheapcurrency gives its exporters an edge in the American marketplace. China then squirrels itsdollar earnings away in American securities rather than spending them on American goods.In normal circumstances these asset purchases would lower interest rates, boosting Americanborrowing and spending. But America, like other rich countries, is now caught in a liquiditytrap. Interest rates are as low as they can go. By saving dollars rather than spending them,China is draining demand from the world economy.

　　克魯曼先生主張，中國被低估的人民幣，讓美國失去了將近一百四十萬個工作。低估的匯率給了中國出口商在美國市場上的優(yōu)勢。然后中國像松鼠般把錢投資到美國證券上存起來，而不是用來買美國的商品。在正常情況下，對美國資產(chǎn)的投資會降低利率，因而提升美國人的借貸和消費。但是美國現(xiàn)在，和其他富有國家一樣，也陷入了所謂的流動性陷阱。利率已經(jīng)降無可降。中國將美元存起而不消費的行為，正消耗著世界的需求。

　　China s foreign-exchange reserves now total $2.4 trillion, of which about 70% are thought tobe in dollars. In 1971 the central banks of America s trading partners had amassed a rathersmaller hoard, of about $40 billion. But that was enough to buy the gold in Fort Knox threetimes over, if America upheld its commitment to sell the metal at $35 an ounce. Britain srequest to exchange dollars for gold on August 13th 1971 was the last straw. Although theUS government attached no great importance to the gold as such, a run on this gold wouldhave been a sorry spectacle, wrote George Shultz and Kenneth Dam, two prominenteconomic officials in the Nixon administration, in their book Economic Policy Beyond theHeadlines. On August 15th Nixon, in effect, announced that America was now unwilling todo what it would soon be incapable of doingconverting dollars into gold at the agreedexchange rate.

　　中國的外匯存底現(xiàn)在總計達2.4萬億美元，其中大約70%是存成美元。在1971年時，美國貿(mào)易伙伴的央行累積的美元不多，大約只有四百億美元。可是如果美國信守當(dāng)時美元和黃金的兌換率，35美元兌一盎司黃金，這些美元已然足夠可以買下三倍諾克斯堡庫存的所有的黃金。英國在1971年8月13日要求將其持有美元兌換黃金是壓倒駱駝的最后一根稻草。兩位尼克松幕僚的重要經(jīng)濟官員，喬治˙舒爾茨和肯尼˙丹，在他們的書頭條背后的經(jīng)濟政策中說，雖然美國政府不認(rèn)為黃金非常重要，但是如果發(fā)生黃金擠兌卻也實在難看。在 8月15日，尼克松實際上宣布了美國政府不愿意履行其即將沒有能力履行的事--將美元按既定的匯率兌換黃金。

　　Messrs Shultz and Dam argue that the import surcharge was intended as anattention-getter and a bargaining chip. It allowed John Connally, Nixon s treasury secretaryand a Texan, to stride down the corridors of international finance with both guns blazing. Inthe face of this bravado America s trading partners duly backed down. By December theyagreed to let the dollar fall and the surcharge wasremoved. Nixon was able to present the humbling of the dollar as a political victory. But wereBarack Obama to emulate him, would he really enjoy the same result?

　　舒爾茨先生和丹先生認(rèn)為進口的附加稅是刻意用來做為注意喚醒劑和談判籌碼。好讓尼克松那位德州人的財政部長約翰˙ 康納利，走在國際金融的大街上，手持雙槍亮晃。在這樣的威嚇下，美國的貿(mào)易伙伴們?nèi)脊怨跃头?。十二月不到，他們就同意讓美元貶值，附加稅也跟著取消。尼克松當(dāng)時將美元的貶值宣傳成政治上的勝利。不過如果奧巴馬如法泡制，他會真的贏得同樣的結(jié)果嗎?

　　The obvious difference is that in 1971 America was locked into a system of fixed parities. Bypegging to the dollar, a currency was automatically fixed to everything else. Since July 2008China has pegged the yuan to the greenback. But over that period its currency has swung upand down against those of its trading partners and competitors. On a trade-weighted basisthe yuan is back to where it was when the financial crisis started. Indeed, compared withChina s emerging-market competitors in its big export markets, the yuan is about 12%more expensive today than it was before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, according to ameasure calculated by the Hong KongMonetary Authority. By this indicator China s currency is about 25% above its level in 2005.

　　今昔最明顯的差別是，在1971年時，美國和其他國家的貨幣是采用固定匯率制。任何一個貨幣，只要對美元掛鉤，就會自動的與其他貨幣掛鉤。自2008年 7月以來，中國維持人民幣與美元掛鉤。但是，在同一段時間里，人民幣與其貿(mào)易伙伴和競爭者的貨幣，在匯率上卻有著上下的擺蕩。以交易額加權(quán)平均數(shù)為基準(zhǔn)來看，人民幣的幣值和金融危機開始時相差不多。根據(jù)香港主管貨幣機構(gòu)編纂的一個指數(shù)，中國比起其出口上競爭的新興國家，確實在幣值上比雷曼兄弟倒閉時升值了 12%。這個指數(shù)也指出，中國的貨幣比2005年的水平要升值了25%。

　　The second difference is related to the first. Because everybody was pegged to the dollar in1971, everybody had to pay the surcharge. Nixon dismayed everyone but discriminatedagainst no one. China s critics today, on the other hand, urge Mr Obama to slap a tariff onChinese goods alone. This will reduce the demand for Chinese imports, which constituteabout 15% of America s total. But there is no guarantee that customers will switch fromChinese goods to American ones instead. They are more likely to buy from China s rivals inAsia. The surcharge may change the composition of America s trade deficit, withoutnecessarily changing its size.

　　第二個差別和第一個有關(guān)。在1971年時，所有的貨幣都和美元掛鉤，所以所有的國家都必須被課附加稅。尼克松讓所有的國家都沮喪，但卻沒對任何一個國家有差別待遇。今天批評中國的人，卻催促奧巴馬先生單獨對中國商品扣上附加稅。雖然這將減少對目前占美國總進口15%的中國進口品的需求。卻不保證消費者會轉(zhuǎn)而購買美國的產(chǎn)品。更可能的是，他們會對中國在亞洲的競爭者下單。附加稅只會改變美國貿(mào)易赤字的組成比例，而不見得能改變其規(guī)模。

　　Nixon goes to China

　　尼克松造訪中國

　　The Nixon shock holds lessons for China as well as Mr Obama. Like China today, Germany inthe 1960s disavowed any responsibility for the world s imbalances, insisting that the solutionlay with tighter policies in deficit countries rather than looser policies in surplus countries. But by holding fast to the dollar, Germanyended up importing America s laxity. It could not insulate itself from the loose monetarypolicy engineered to help Nixon win the 1972 election. German prices rose by over 5% in1971. China, too, risks a loss of macroeconomic control if it continues to peg to the dollar.Its money supply grew by about 35% in the year to February. That kind of surge may be aprecursor to inflation.

　　尼克松的沖擊，對中國以及奧巴馬來說，都有借鏡之處。正如今日的中國，1960年代的德國，也是拒絕承認(rèn)對世界的貿(mào)易失衡有任何關(guān)系，并堅持解決之道在于貿(mào)易逆差國要緊縮，而不是貿(mào)易順差國要放寬。可是經(jīng)由對美元的掛鉤，德國最終進口到美國貨幣上的寬松。尼克松為了贏得1972年選舉，泡制了寬松的貨幣政策，而德國無法置身其外。德國物價在1971年上升了超過5%。如果人民幣繼續(xù)和美元掛鉤，中國也同樣冒著宏觀經(jīng)濟失控的風(fēng)險。該國貨幣供給在到二月份截止的年度里成長了35%。這種飆升也許是通脹的前兆。

　　The advocates of a surcharge argue that China will not act unless it is forced to do so. Theypoint to defensive remarks by Wen Jiabao, China s prime minister, arguing that the yuanwas not undervalued and would remain basically stable. But the demise of the BrettonWoods system suggests that official statements can be a poor guide to future policy. Thedecision not to revalue is final, unequivocal and for eternity. That s not a Chinese officialin 2010, but a German official in the Nixon erajust five months before the Deutschmark wasrevalued by 9.3%.

　　附加稅的鼓吹者主張，中國必須要有人施壓才會行動。他們指出中國的總理溫家寶仍做著防衛(wèi)性的評論，說人民幣并沒被低估，也將會維持基本上穩(wěn)定。但是布雷頓森林體系的廢棄，說明著官方說詞通常不代表未來政策的走向。德國官方在尼克松時代說，我們決定不升值，而這決定是不會改變、毫不含糊、直到永久。這聽起來像是中國官方的說法。在五個月后，德國馬克升值了 9.3%。