2023考研英語閱讀謊言誘惑下的合作
HOW people collaborate, in the face of numeroustemptations to cheat, is an important field ofpsychological and economic research. A lot of thisresearch focuses on the tit-for-tat theory of co-operation: that humans are disposed, when dealingwith another person, to behave in a generousmanner until that other person shows himself not tobe generous. At this point co-operation iswithdrawn. Fool me once, in other words, shameon you. Fool me twice, shame on me.
人們在難以數計的謊言誘惑下會怎樣進行合作，是心理學和經濟學研究中的重要課題。有關這個課題的研究通常集中于對投桃報李理論的研究，這個理論認為：人們總是傾向于向別人表現慷慨，除非對方表現出不慷慨的態度。在這個時候合作往往會終止。換句話說，人如果受到一次愚弄，或許是因為錯在對方。如果再次受到對方愚弄，就只能怪自己不吸取教訓了。
When he encounters such a withdrawal of collaboration, the theory goes, the malefactor willlearn the error of his ways and become a more co-operative individual. And there isexperimental evidence, based on specially designed games, that tit-for-tat does work forpairs of people. Human societies, though, are more complex than mere dyads. And untilrecently, it has been difficult to model that complexity in the laboratory. But a paper publishedthis week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences by Nicholas Christakis and hiscolleagues at Harvard has changed that. Dr Christakis arranged for a collaboration-testinggame to be played over the web, with many participants. As a result, he and his team havegained a more sophisticated insight into the way co-operation develops.
根據這個理論，一旦作惡的一方得不到對方的合作，他將會從自己的錯誤中吸取教訓，并變成一個更具有合作精神的人。根據從特別設計的游戲中取得的實驗證據，投桃報李的原則確實適用于成對的研究對象。不過人類社會要比成對的研究對象復雜得多。直到最近為止，研究人員都很難在實驗室中模擬出社會生活中的復雜情景。不過哈佛大學的尼古拉斯?克里斯塔和他的同事們本周在《美國國家科學院院刊》上發表的論文改變了這個現實。克里斯塔博士設計了一個能夠在互聯網上供多人參與的合作測試游戲。根據這個游戲，克里斯塔博士和他的團隊獲得更多的資料，得以了解合作關系的演變規律。
Dr Christakis used what is known as a public-goods game for his experiment. At the beginningof such a game, points are doled out to each participant. During every round, players aregiven the opportunity to donate points to their neighbours. Points so donated are augmentedby an equal number from the masters of the game. If everyone co-operates, then, everyoneends up richer. A defector who refuses to donate to his co-operating neighbours will,however, benefit at the expense of those neighbours. At the games end, the points areconverted into real money, to ensure that proper incentives are in place.
克里斯塔博士在實驗中使用了一種稱為公開物品的游戲。在比賽開始時，每個參與者都獲得一定的分數。在每輪游戲中，游戲者都有機會給周圍的人一些分數。游戲的主持人會將參與者給予別人的分數翻倍。如果每個人都采取合作的態度，那么每個人都會得到更多的分數。游戲中的叛逃者，即拒絕將分數贈送給鄰人的參與者，能夠從別人的損失中獲益。在游戲結束時，所有的分數都會轉換成實際的金錢，以保障游戲具有適當的激勵機制。
To play his large-scale public-goods game, Dr Christakis recruited 785 volunteers via MechanicalTurka service provided by Amazon, an online retailer, that works by farming out small tasksto an army of individual workers. Each volunteer was randomly assigned links to, on average,eight other players. Together, they played repeated rounds of one of three variations of thegame.
為了將這個公開物品游戲推而廣之，克里斯塔博士通過土耳其機器人召集了785個志愿者。每個參與者都能夠隨機分配到幾個鄰人，平均來說，每個人一般能分到八個鄰人。他們一起參與三種不同游戲形式，在每種形式中都會反復玩上幾輪。
In the first, participants always interacted with the same group of people. In the second, theconnections were randomly reshuffled after each round. In the final version, one-third of thepossible pairings between participants were chosen at random after each round . Oneplayer from each pair was first told or reminded of how the other had behaved in the previousround, and was then asked whether he wanted to break his connection with that player, if healready had one, or form a new connection, if he had not.
起初，參與者總是與同組人玩。接下來，每結束一輪，參與者之間的聯系都會隨機打亂，并重新分組。在最后的階段，每一輪結束時都會隨機挑選出三分之一的參與者讓他們有機會重新配對。每對組合中都會有一個人能夠首先得知合作對方或將要合作的參與者在過去的游戲中表現如何，然后會問他是否還愿意和對方合作，或者是否愿意和對方結伴。
In all versions of the game, roughly 60% of players started out co-operating. However, in thefirst two, this decreased over time as the pernicious influence of the freeloaders spread. Thelarger the fraction of a subjects partners who defected in a given round, the less likely thatperson was to co-operate in the nextclassical tit-for-tat. However, this tit-for-tat retaliationwas not enough to save co-operation, and after a dozen rounds only 10-20% of the playerswere still willing to co-operate.
在游戲的三種模式中，大約有60%的參與者起初都愿意表現合作精神。不過在前兩種形式中，合作者的數目隨著不勞而獲者不斷散播的消極影響，而逐漸減少。在特定的游戲中，調查對象的合作者中如果存在越多的人扮演叛逃者，該對象在下一輪游戲中就越不愿意表現合作精神這正是典型的投桃報李精神。不過這種投桃報李的回饋態度無法維持合作關系，在大約12輪游戲后，只有大約10-20%的參與者仍然愿意表現合作精神。
In the variant where participants had some choice over whom they interacted with, though, theamount of co-operation stayed stable as the rounds progressed. When Dr Christakis and histeam looked at how the relationships between players were evolving in this third version, theyfound that connections between two co-operators were much more likely to be maintained thanlinks that involved a defector. Over time, the co-operators accumulated more social connectionsthan the defectors did.
不過在游戲的第三種形式中，即參與者有權選擇合作對象時，愿意表現合作精神的人數并沒有隨著游戲次數的增加而減少。比較過三種游戲形式中參與者相互關系的演變規律后，克里斯塔博士和他的團隊發現二個同是合作者之間的關系要比其中一個是叛逃者之間的關系更容易維持。隨著時間的推移，合作者比叛逃者積累了更多的社會關系。
Furthermore, as they were shunned, the defectors began to change their behaviour. Adefectors likelihood of switching to co-operation increased with the number of players whohad broken links with him in the previous round. Unlike straightforward tit-for-tat, socialretaliation was having a marked effect.
不僅如此，由于受到大家的回避，叛逃者也開改變自己的行為。如果在上一次游戲中有越多的參與者拒絕與某個叛逃者合作，那么這個人在下一次的游戲中就越可能變成合作者。與單純的投桃報李相比，社會回饋更有助于維系人與人之間的關系。
The next question, then, is whether such a mechanism holds outside the laboratory. To findout, Dr Christakis has forged links with some anthropologists. They hope to report the answersoon.
接下來的問題是這一機制是否能推廣到實驗室之外呢?為了找到這個問題的答案，克里斯塔博士已經與一些人類學家取得合作。他們希望能夠盡快回答這個問題。
HOW people collaborate, in the face of numeroustemptations to cheat, is an important field ofpsychological and economic research. A lot of thisresearch focuses on the tit-for-tat theory of co-operation: that humans are disposed, when dealingwith another person, to behave in a generousmanner until that other person shows himself not tobe generous. At this point co-operation iswithdrawn. Fool me once, in other words, shameon you. Fool me twice, shame on me.
人們在難以數計的謊言誘惑下會怎樣進行合作，是心理學和經濟學研究中的重要課題。有關這個課題的研究通常集中于對投桃報李理論的研究，這個理論認為：人們總是傾向于向別人表現慷慨，除非對方表現出不慷慨的態度。在這個時候合作往往會終止。換句話說，人如果受到一次愚弄，或許是因為錯在對方。如果再次受到對方愚弄，就只能怪自己不吸取教訓了。
When he encounters such a withdrawal of collaboration, the theory goes, the malefactor willlearn the error of his ways and become a more co-operative individual. And there isexperimental evidence, based on specially designed games, that tit-for-tat does work forpairs of people. Human societies, though, are more complex than mere dyads. And untilrecently, it has been difficult to model that complexity in the laboratory. But a paper publishedthis week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences by Nicholas Christakis and hiscolleagues at Harvard has changed that. Dr Christakis arranged for a collaboration-testinggame to be played over the web, with many participants. As a result, he and his team havegained a more sophisticated insight into the way co-operation develops.
根據這個理論，一旦作惡的一方得不到對方的合作，他將會從自己的錯誤中吸取教訓，并變成一個更具有合作精神的人。根據從特別設計的游戲中取得的實驗證據，投桃報李的原則確實適用于成對的研究對象。不過人類社會要比成對的研究對象復雜得多。直到最近為止，研究人員都很難在實驗室中模擬出社會生活中的復雜情景。不過哈佛大學的尼古拉斯?克里斯塔和他的同事們本周在《美國國家科學院院刊》上發表的論文改變了這個現實。克里斯塔博士設計了一個能夠在互聯網上供多人參與的合作測試游戲。根據這個游戲，克里斯塔博士和他的團隊獲得更多的資料，得以了解合作關系的演變規律。
Dr Christakis used what is known as a public-goods game for his experiment. At the beginningof such a game, points are doled out to each participant. During every round, players aregiven the opportunity to donate points to their neighbours. Points so donated are augmentedby an equal number from the masters of the game. If everyone co-operates, then, everyoneends up richer. A defector who refuses to donate to his co-operating neighbours will,however, benefit at the expense of those neighbours. At the games end, the points areconverted into real money, to ensure that proper incentives are in place.
克里斯塔博士在實驗中使用了一種稱為公開物品的游戲。在比賽開始時，每個參與者都獲得一定的分數。在每輪游戲中，游戲者都有機會給周圍的人一些分數。游戲的主持人會將參與者給予別人的分數翻倍。如果每個人都采取合作的態度，那么每個人都會得到更多的分數。游戲中的叛逃者，即拒絕將分數贈送給鄰人的參與者，能夠從別人的損失中獲益。在游戲結束時，所有的分數都會轉換成實際的金錢，以保障游戲具有適當的激勵機制。
To play his large-scale public-goods game, Dr Christakis recruited 785 volunteers via MechanicalTurka service provided by Amazon, an online retailer, that works by farming out small tasksto an army of individual workers. Each volunteer was randomly assigned links to, on average,eight other players. Together, they played repeated rounds of one of three variations of thegame.
為了將這個公開物品游戲推而廣之，克里斯塔博士通過土耳其機器人召集了785個志愿者。每個參與者都能夠隨機分配到幾個鄰人，平均來說，每個人一般能分到八個鄰人。他們一起參與三種不同游戲形式，在每種形式中都會反復玩上幾輪。
In the first, participants always interacted with the same group of people. In the second, theconnections were randomly reshuffled after each round. In the final version, one-third of thepossible pairings between participants were chosen at random after each round . Oneplayer from each pair was first told or reminded of how the other had behaved in the previousround, and was then asked whether he wanted to break his connection with that player, if healready had one, or form a new connection, if he had not.
起初，參與者總是與同組人玩。接下來，每結束一輪，參與者之間的聯系都會隨機打亂，并重新分組。在最后的階段，每一輪結束時都會隨機挑選出三分之一的參與者讓他們有機會重新配對。每對組合中都會有一個人能夠首先得知合作對方或將要合作的參與者在過去的游戲中表現如何，然后會問他是否還愿意和對方合作，或者是否愿意和對方結伴。
In all versions of the game, roughly 60% of players started out co-operating. However, in thefirst two, this decreased over time as the pernicious influence of the freeloaders spread. Thelarger the fraction of a subjects partners who defected in a given round, the less likely thatperson was to co-operate in the nextclassical tit-for-tat. However, this tit-for-tat retaliationwas not enough to save co-operation, and after a dozen rounds only 10-20% of the playerswere still willing to co-operate.
在游戲的三種模式中，大約有60%的參與者起初都愿意表現合作精神。不過在前兩種形式中，合作者的數目隨著不勞而獲者不斷散播的消極影響，而逐漸減少。在特定的游戲中，調查對象的合作者中如果存在越多的人扮演叛逃者，該對象在下一輪游戲中就越不愿意表現合作精神這正是典型的投桃報李精神。不過這種投桃報李的回饋態度無法維持合作關系，在大約12輪游戲后，只有大約10-20%的參與者仍然愿意表現合作精神。
In the variant where participants had some choice over whom they interacted with, though, theamount of co-operation stayed stable as the rounds progressed. When Dr Christakis and histeam looked at how the relationships between players were evolving in this third version, theyfound that connections between two co-operators were much more likely to be maintained thanlinks that involved a defector. Over time, the co-operators accumulated more social connectionsthan the defectors did.
不過在游戲的第三種形式中，即參與者有權選擇合作對象時，愿意表現合作精神的人數并沒有隨著游戲次數的增加而減少。比較過三種游戲形式中參與者相互關系的演變規律后，克里斯塔博士和他的團隊發現二個同是合作者之間的關系要比其中一個是叛逃者之間的關系更容易維持。隨著時間的推移，合作者比叛逃者積累了更多的社會關系。
Furthermore, as they were shunned, the defectors began to change their behaviour. Adefectors likelihood of switching to co-operation increased with the number of players whohad broken links with him in the previous round. Unlike straightforward tit-for-tat, socialretaliation was having a marked effect.
不僅如此，由于受到大家的回避，叛逃者也開改變自己的行為。如果在上一次游戲中有越多的參與者拒絕與某個叛逃者合作，那么這個人在下一次的游戲中就越可能變成合作者。與單純的投桃報李相比，社會回饋更有助于維系人與人之間的關系。
The next question, then, is whether such a mechanism holds outside the laboratory. To findout, Dr Christakis has forged links with some anthropologists. They hope to report the answersoon.
接下來的問題是這一機制是否能推廣到實驗室之外呢?為了找到這個問題的答案，克里斯塔博士已經與一些人類學家取得合作。他們希望能夠盡快回答這個問題。
